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RENOVATING SPACE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW
P.J. BLOUNT*

Buildings are constructed by first erecting an interior frame or
architecture and then, upon that architecture, the exterior is layered on
giving the building its appearance. In a similar fashion law is often
layered on underlying social and geopolitical structures forming a
structure which then affects how we interpret the underlying social
structure.' Law, to the extent that it is reactionary in this manner, can
only be fully understood when the underlying architecture that it has
been mapped onto is exposed. Often though, like in older buildings, we
find that the underlying architecture has changed. In buildings
termites and settling affect the structure without changing the exterior
characteristics. Law is similar to the extent that the values it embodies
can remain in place well past the demise of the social structures that it
was built to regulate. Due to the dynamic nature of the social sphere,
law can encounter application and interpretation problems later in its
life. Rigid interpretations may be a bad fit for newer developments,
whereas adaptive interpretations can become controversial. Striking a
balance in this spectrum can be difficult.
Understanding the architecture that laws are built on is important
in understanding if and how older regulations can be applied to modern
times. This is especially important in laws dealing with technological
areas which are prone to rapid change but that nonetheless need
regulation. In this article, the term "architecture" is used to describe
the underlying social, cultural, and political environment that
inevitably influenced the development of law. The interests involved in
these areas build a framework upon which the law is then mapped so as
to best serve the goals sought. Obviously though, society and politics
are not static, and when they change the law is often left as a rigid exostructure that no longer suits the architecture underneath. It becomes a
* National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law.
1. It should be acknowledged that this is not a perfect analogy, and indeed is one
that can be flipped on its head by arguing that law forms the architecture and society
maps itself around law. In fact most likely both phenomena are happening. It is
submitted though, that at the international level and especially in the area of regulation
of technologies, the competing interests of States create an environment wherein law is
more likely to be mapped onto geopolitical structures than vice versa.

515

516

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 40:1-3

historic building in need of restoration, and the law can often, in a
sense, be renovated by evaluating the new architecture and remapping
to suit that framework.
International space law (and indeed much of international law) is
currently at a place wherein its underlying architecture has
dramatically changed. This paper will discuss the future challenges for
international space law as it is applied to new geopolitical situations
and the trends that are developing as this process takes place. Part I
will describe the architecture upon which international space law was
built, Part II will discuss how that architecture has changed, and Part
III will analyze the trends that are changing the structure of space law
and shaping its future.
I. BUILDING A COLD WAR BUILDING
It is no secret that international space law is a product of the Cold
War. There is a great deal of literature on its development and the
roles that the United States and the Soviet Union played in negotiating
the original founding principles. 2 This article will, as much as possible,
avoid revisiting this well documented past. However, it will seek to
give an understanding of the regulatory goals that the architects were
building for in this geopolitical climate.
The primary goal of the architects when first negotiating space law
principles was security.3 The popular narrative that accompanies the
Space Race at the beginning of the "space age," involves two
superpowers vying for technological superiority over the other. The
launch of Sputnik is often portrayed as a black eye to the United States
in its quest for space superiority, from a country that should have been
its technological inferior. 4 The oft forgotten part of that narrative is
that the Soviet launch raised a serious strategic threat to the United

2. See generally Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Space Law: Its Cold War Origins and
Challenges in the Era of Globalization, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1041 (2004); WALTER
MCDOUGAL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE
(1985).

3. One of the prominent themes in Space Law is the concept of "peaceful purposes,"
this is because of the close relationship of space technology to that of weapons delivery
systems. The lawmaking process held international peace and security at its heart, and
the value is explicitly stated in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty: "States Parties to
the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and
security and promoting international co-operation and understanding." Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4. Dwayne Day, The Sputnik Non-surprise, THE SPACE REVIEW, Sept. 8, 2009,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1457/1.
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States, in that it showed that the Soviet Union was much closer to the
technology that would allow for the intercontinental delivery system for
a nuclear warhead (an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - ICBM).
Tensions rose between the two states as they both got closer to
developing not only the delivery capability for nuclear weapons but also
the nuclear weapons themselves. The international community and
specifically the two superpowers saw that there was great strategic
risk, and that it warranted negotiating principles to reduce these
tensions. This resulted in a UN General Assembly Declaration of Legal
Principles followed by the Outer Space Treaty. 5 The legal principles
found in these documents were specifically designed to ease tension in
outer space activities.
Some of these principles are outright
prescriptions, such as the ban on the "national appropriation" of space. 6
Others are softer obligations that serve to build confidence by placing
strong emphasis on principles such as transparency and international
cooperation. 7 The principles as a whole though served to lay the
foundation of a legal regime that promoted the peaceful exploration of
space by reducing the opportunity for tensions in the new arena.
These principles were later integrated into the Outer Space Treaty,
which has been referred to as a "constitution for space." 8 This treaty,
though, was designed to suit underlying societal and political realities
that shaped the drafters goals.9 Primary amongst these realities is that
the treaty was built around a binary world; one dominated by two
symmetric yet opposed powers. 10 As a result the law had to be seen by

5. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess.,
1280th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
6. Id. princ. 3.
7. Id. princ. 6.
8. Stanley B. Rosenfield, Where Air Space Ends and Outer Space Begins, 7 J. Space
L. 137, 144 (1979).
9. It should be noted that this is not a critique of the drafters. They were writing law
for the world they knew, and could not be expected to envision the changes in the
geopolitical climate nor in the nature of space activities. While predictions of future
technology are ubiquitous, they are often incorrect. See generally The Paleofuture,
http://www.paleofuture.com/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
10. The use of symmetric here refers to goals and strategies. See P.J. Blount, The
Development of InternationalNorms to Enhance Space Security Law in An Asymmetric
World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52ND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (2010).

While technological and military might was not always in symmetry, the two states
pursued very similar strategies in coping with the others power. The arms race the
primary example of this relationship. Both sought sheer numerical superiority, as
opposed to others sorts of advantages. This can be compared today wherein both States
and other actors seek to gain strategic advantage via asymmetrical means. For example, a
prominent thought in Chinese theory on warfare is the idea of defeating the superior with
the inferior. See Zhao Nanqi, Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Defense Modernization, in
CHINESE VIEWS OF FUTURE WARFARE 11, 18 (Michael Pillsbury ed., 1998).
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both of these nations as serving its own self interests, otherwise it
would fail for lack of support from one or the other. This, predictably,
had a dramatic effect on the final product, in that law reduced tensions,
but at the same time left lacunae in which states could pursue their
own security interests.
A second underlying assumption that is critical to understanding
the regulatory system adopted is that space activities were to be purely
While future commercial activities were to a
state undertakings."
small extent envisioned, international space law was built on the
principle that space activities are uniquely state controlled activities.
To this end the negotiators sought to control state actions as opposed to
those of private actors. The idea of private actors was not completely
ignored though, and Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty was drafted to
This article is quite exceptional in
deal with such situations.
international law and makes states "internationally responsible for
national activities in outer space" carried on by non-governmental
actors. 12 At the end of the day though, the law was crafted around an
architecture that did not include a full panoply of non-governmental
actors, and has left numerous question about the obligations that states
have to regulate these entities.
This geopolitical situation formed the underlying architecture that
international space law was mapped onto. The space treaties were built
to serve regulatory goals that served the vision of the world held by the
drafters at the time. In fact mapping the law onto this structure was
critical in achieving the primary regulatory goal of increasing
international peace and security. If the law had not been constructed in
such a way as to conform with the geopolitical architecture it is
arguable that the system could have collapsed like a house of cards.
II. THE NEED FOR RENOVATION

In the past 20 years, the geopolitical climate in which space
activities take place has changed dramatically. Most notably, the Cold

11. Eilene Galloway, The Community of Law and Science, 1 PRoc. COLL. L. OUTER
SPACE 62 (Andrew G. Haley & Welf Heinrich eds., Wein, Springer, Verlag 1959) (arguing
that due to the great cost of space exploration "it is a matter for government
appropriations."). See Legal Problems of Space Exploration: A Symposium, prepared for
the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, by the
Legislative Reference Service, Mar. 22, 1961, Washington, Library of Congress, 450
(1961).
12. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. VI. Compare this to the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility which states that States only bear international responsibility when
those actions are attributable to the State. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 8.
It should be noted that Article 11 of the Draft Articles allow States to accept greater
obligations in relation to making actions by non-governmental actors attributable to it,
which is what the Outer Space Treaty does in Article VI. Id. Art. 11.
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War ended and commercial actors have begun to edge their way into the
market. These events have changed underlying architecture that space
law was built around.
The End of a Binary Existence
The end of the Cold War, predictably, has had a dramatic effect on
geopolitics in the world. No longer did two diametrically opposed
symmetric superpowers exist. Instead there remained a dominant
superpower, and "[s]pace went from being a two-player game with both
players starting from the same point and nearly equally matched, to a
multiplayer game with one leading player and many other various
points of a spectrum of capabilities."1 3 Specifically, Asian states have
begun to get very involved in space activities. China, Japan, and Korea
have all started their own space programs with varying levels of
success. Korea is developing its indigenous launch capability14 , Japan
has become an important partner in the ISS15, and China has become
the third nation to embark on a human exploration program' 6 _ In fact,
some commentators have referred to this trend as a "new space race"
that pits Asian nations against each other, but also
in another
iteration - pits the United States against China.1 7
Additionally, developing nations have begun to gain an increasing
interest in access to the benefits of space technology. These states'
interests come in a wide variety. Some partner to gain access to data,
some contract to have satellites launched on their behalf, and others
seek out indigenous technologies. Developing nations have embraced
space technology as way to participate in the global community via
access to better telecommunications technologies as well as access to
the benefits of remote sensing technologies, and this has led to the

13. JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, HEAVENLY AMBITIONS 4 (2009).
14. Sang-Myon Rhee, Current Status and Recent Developments in Korea's National
Space Laws, 35 J. SPACE L. 523, 526-27 (2009).
15. See Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of the Member
States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the
Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America Concerning
Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (Jan. 29, 1998), available at
http://web1.olemiss.edu/ncrsasl/atlas/archive/files/48fl051fcc3fa68947ea7941fd7340b7.pdf.
See also Memorandum of Understanding between the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning
Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station (Feb. 24, 1998), available at
http://www.nasa.gov/missionpages/station/structure/elements/nasajapan.html.
16. China puts its first man in space, BBC, Oct. 15, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hilasia-pacific/3192330.stm.
17. Bruce Sterling, The New Space Race, WIRED, Dec. 2004, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/12.12/china.html and Jeff Foust, China and the US: Space Race or
Miscommunication, THE SPACE REVIEW, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/
article/1075/1.
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adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution on space and developing
countries.18 States have traditionally seen space as a way improve the
lives of their citizens, achieve security goals, and increase their
international stature.1 9 Space activities though have not been divorced
from their early roots. Indicative of this is that some states have
pursued space to achieve strategic goals by developing launch delivery
systems. States such as Iran 20 and North Korea 21 have pursued
indigenous launch capability in order to develop completely domestic
space programs and possible ICBM capabilities. These states have used
the terms of the Outer Space Treaty to justify their exploration of
technology that can lead to the development of delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction. 22
International space law was built around the tenets of
international peace and security. To this end the Outer Space Treaty
and its progeny can and should be read as security treaties. As already
stated, they are security treaties built around a bipolar world. The
goals and aspirations of these treaties still remain valid, but the
activities they were meant to support and regulate have changed
dramatically. First, maintaining security in a world with a wider and
more disparately situated set of actors has become increasingly
challenging. During the Cold War "the modus operandi that arose
between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War
that each side appeared to value its own assets more than it valued the
ability to destroy the assets of its adversaries." 23 This strategic balance
is shifting with the proliferation of space actors. The idea that there are
spoilers who might value the destruction of an adversary's space asset
over preservation of their own is emerging. 24 The most accessible
example of this is the entry of Iran and the attempted entry of North
Korea into space activities. These outliers have both sought to become

18. Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the
Needs of Developing Countries, U.N.G.A. Res. 51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996).
19. For example, the Japanese Space Policy includes sections on economic growth,
strategic growth, and space diplomacy. Setsuko Aoki, Japanese Law and Regulations
ConcerningRemote Sensing Activities, 36 J. Space L. 335, 350-64 (2010).
20. Adam Gabbat, Iran Rocket Launch Opens Can of Worms in Space Race with West,
THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/03/iran-launchesrocket-carrying- animals.
21. See THE NORTH KOREAN EXPENDABLE CARRIER ROCKET, UNHA-2:

SELECTED

LEGAL DOCUMENTS (P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz eds., 2010).
22. See P.J. Blount, Developments in Space Security Law and Their Legal
Implications,44/2 LAW/TECHNOLOGY 19, 35-39 (2011).
23. ROGER G. HARRISON, SPACE AND VERIFICATION

VOLUME I: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

9 (Eisenhower Center 2011).
24. Charles D. Lutes, report, National Space Forum 2007: Towards a Theory of
Spacepower, 2 SPACE AND DEFENSE 41, 55 (2008).
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space actors, conspicuously though they are also both pursuing the
development of nuclear weapons, and space launch vehicles are a very
similar technology to ICBMs. Both countries though have used the
concept of "peaceful purposes" 25 and have capitalized on the Outer
Space Treaty guarantee of "free acceSS" 2 6 as a shield to their activities.
This is troubling because it allows the very laws that are supposed to
ensure peace and security in space to be invoked to protect the
development of technologies that can threaten peace and security
terrestrially.
Another example of the increasing complexity of space activities
can be seen in the relations between the United States and China. The
United States does not trust China to not exploit space technologies to
increase its military might, and to this end, whether right of wrong, the
United States actively marginalizes China from space cooperation
activities. 27 As a result, China has successfully developed these
technologies without the assistance of the world's leading space power.
However, China also often behaves in a non-cooperative manner that
threatens the security and safety of the space environment, which could
probably be avoided if a more open dialogue was had among the space
faring states. While the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty sought
facilitate such discourse, the gaps left by the geopolitical architecture
leave seams that both the United States and China can exploit.
The Ticket Office is Now Open
The second major development is the rise of commercial actors in
space. Currently, there are several entrepreneurial companies around
the world seeking to gain private access to space for a variety of
reasons. 28 Interestingly, these "newspace" companies are seeking to
step outside the status quo of governmental contracting which has been
the norm for commercial space actors to date. 29 These entities are
seeking to jumpstart business models for space tourism and private
launch providers. While the success of this strategy has yet to be seen,
25. Iran launches homegrown satellite, BBC, Feb. 3, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/7866357.stm and KCNA, Preparationsfor Launch of Experimental Communications
Satellite in Full Gear, in THE NORTH KOREAN EXPENDABLE CARRIER ROCKET, UNHA-2:
SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS, supranote 21, at 31.
26. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. I.
27. Keith B. Richburg, Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html.
28. Jeff Foust, The evolving ecosystem of NewSpace, THE SPACE REVIEw, Aug. 15,
2011, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1906/1.
29. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MARYLAND:
THE BUSINESS OF SPACE SCIENCE 11 (May 2011) ("For decades it was largely driven by
government markets and manned space flight. While still substantial, government
spending on space no longer accounts for the majority of economic activity.").
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there is hope that these companies can survive. The idea of privatizing
space access does seem to be gaining ground, as well. Of particular
interest is the new United States Space Policy which relies on buying
services from such providers in the post Space Shuttle era. 30 The
government is looking to buy the service as opposed to the hardware. 31
This, of course, begs the question of whether these start-up companies
will rely on government contracts for their existence much as their
predecessors have. Regardless, though, these companies seem to be
fundamentally different, and that difference is helping to change the
state motivations behind space regulation.
The shift that is being seen in space regulation is an important one,
since it serves to inform what state interests and goals are. As stated
above security has been a primary and historical goal of states when
regulating space activities. Commercial actors in space have begun to
change how states view regulatory goals. Specifically, the goal of
fostering commercial space activities to enhance the economic life of the
country and to enhance the everyday life of citizens has been
introduced. This goal is different in form and often conflicts with ideas
of security. A prime example of this is the ongoing debate over property
rights on celestial bodies. 32 Property rights for private entities would
be more economically favorable to commercial space exploration as it
would help to ensure investments of companies seeking to exploit
resources on celestial bodies. However, if as the majority of scholars
argue, these rights are precluded by the Outer Space Treaty, then
private entities will lack incentive to invest in the exploitation of those
resources due to the lack of predictability on whether the investment
will be protected. The non-appropriation clause in the Outer Space
Treaty does indeed serve a security interest by disincentivizing states
from reenacting terrestrial "land rushes" and taking boundary disputes
- a traditional reason for armed conflict - into space.3 3 The conflict

30. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (June 28, 2010).
31. To this end NASA has sponsored Space Act Agreements through its Commercial
Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program to help commercial actors develop their
technology. NASA, Commercial Crew and Cargo Program: Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/429622mainFS-2009006-009-JSC-COTS021710.pdf.
32. See generally FABIO TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF
THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL REGIME (Martinus
Nijhoff 2009); VIRGILIU POP, WHO OWNS THE MOON?: EXTRATERRESTIAL ASPECTS OF LAND
AND MINERAL RESOURCES OWNERSHIP (Springer 2009).
both the Soviet Union and the
33. JOHNSON-FREESE, supra note 13, at 34 (".
United States instead endorsed the principle that sovereignty cannot be extended to
space. Both countries took the approach that it was in their interests to use space to
stabilize deterrence, the guiding strategic doctrine of the day, and to support arms control
toward that goal. That meant that in order to protect their own interests, both had to
accept the use of space by each other, and eventually other countries. This acceptance
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between these goals increases risk for commercial actors in an already
risky environment.
States are now beginning to adopt as a goal the development of the
commercial space industry. This differs from a great deal of national
legislation which is intended to protect national security interests as
well as ensure compliance with international treaties. A robust
commercial space industry can be a competing goal with national
security, and poses specific problems for compliance with international
agreements. While there is now a trend among nations to write such
encouragement into national legislation, these laws must comport with
the requirements of the Outer Space Treaty. But as explored below
these laws can inform, via a feedback loop, us as to the content of the
norms contained in the Outer Space Treaty, especially in light of its
more ambiguous terms.
III. THE FUTURE OF SPACE LAW
TearingDown the House?
Drawing from the architecture analogy, the immediate question
when approaching an old structure is whether it should be razed and a
new structure built, or whether it can be salvaged and whether it is
worth being salvaged. Are its boards to rotten to support new users,
and can it be adapted to fit the new uses? The first question to be
addressed when investigating the future of space law is whether the
international regime flowing from the Outer Space Treaty can still be
effective in a dramatically changed world.
The arguments for scrapping the system include a lack of clarity in
the Outer Space Treaty, the inhibiting nature of its rules due to
drafting for a different geopolitical climate, and its lack of attention to
commercial entities. 3 4
These arguments point to lacunae and
ambiguous terms found in the regime, which create questions of
meaning and the possibility for low or unfavorable regulability of some
activities. For instance, the Chinese ASAT of 2007 was unarguably a
destabilizing moment for space and led to decreased security and safety
in space. However, legal scholars, though mostly in agreement that the
act was not within the spirit of the law, were hard pressed to find a

reflected a largely tacit acknowledgement that the physical environment of space was so
different, and limiting, that there was little choice but to treat it differently in terms of
expectations of sovereign rights.").
34. See generally John Hickman, Still crazy after four decades: The case for
withdrawing from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, THE SPACE REVIEW, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/960/1. Theresa Hitchens, The Perfect Storm:
InternationalReaction to the Bush National Space Policy, HIGH FRONTIER JOURNAL, Mar.
2007, at 23.
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specific clause that outlawed such behavior. 35 Most argued that China
violated Article IX by not seeking consultations. 36 States on the other
hand, made diplomatic protests, but did not direct legal claims at
China. 37 This is because the Outer Space Treaty left the use of
conventional weapons an open question, by simply not addressing them
in relation to space.3 8 Some would argue that this justifies the
negotiation of a new treaty that better protects the space environment.
While these arguments can be compelling, they fall short of being
realistic, primarily due to state reluctance to adopt new space law. 3 9
The last space treaty, the Moon Agreement, was adopted in 1979 and
has only 13 States Parties. 40 States seem to be uninterested in
negotiating new law, and the idea of renegotiating the principle
document is outside the realm of current possibility.
More
substantively, renegotiating the Outer Space Treaty would most likely
only result in a different treaty that has many of the same flaws. No
treaty completely covers all possible scenarios, thus no treaty is ever
complete. To this end the Outer Space Treaty actually has great
advantages. It holds very few hard prescriptive articles, and instead
regulates with open language that requires states to communicate in
order to avoid conflicts. This tactic also allows that treaty to develop
via state practice, which adds to its adaptability.
The Outer Space Treaty sets out core values and aspirations that
are still at the heart of international space law, many of which may
have solidified into custom. These core concepts though must be able to
adapt to the actual experience of space actors. As a result, the treaty
must be remapped onto the new architecture. This remapping is
happening through a variety of mechanisms that are helping to protect
state interests as well as increase the regulability of space.

35. See generally Li Juqian, Legality and Legitimacy: China's ASAT Test, 5 CHINA
SECURITY 43 (2009); Eugene Marder, CPR for the OST: How China's Anti-Satellite
Weapon Test Can Breathe New Life into Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, Center for
Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/ChineseASATtest.pdf (2008); Michael C.
Mineiro, FY-IC and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts:An Assessment of Legal Obligations under
Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 J. SPACE L. 321 (2008).

36. Marder, supra note 35; Mineiro, supra note 35.
37. Marder, supra note 35, at 1-2, 11.
38. Arguably, this is by design since Article IV of the Treaty specifically bans
weapons of mass destruction from space and celestial bodies and specifically bans
conventional weapons from celestial bodies, but fails to mention conventional weapons in
relation to space. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. IV.
39. For a history of International space law regulation see Sergio Marchisio, The
Evolutionary Stages of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), 31 J. SPACE L. 219 (2005).
40. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter Moon
Agreement].

RENOVATING SPACE

2012

525

Soft Law
Soft Law mechanisms are becoming a more prevalent aspect of
international law. States seek legal order in order to create orderly
relations among themselves, but hard law obligations "[entail]
significant costs: hard law restricts actors' behavior and even their
sovereignty." 4 1 Soft law comes in many forms and is difficult to define.
Abbot and Snidal argue that "[t]he realm of 'soft law' begins once legal
arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of
obligation, precision, and delegation" with the "softening ... occur[ing]
in varying degrees along each dimension and in different combinations
across dimensions." 42 Essentially, soft law occurs on a spectrum, and
"the choice between hard law and soft law is not a binary one." 4 3 Due to
their nonbinding nature these mechanisms can help states to maximize
the goals being sought while minimizing the risk taken.4 4 As a result
soft law agreements are "often easier to achieve than hard
legalization."4 5 This allows states to creatively tackle international
problems for which they are unwilling to make sacrifices of their own
sovereignty.
Space law is no stranger to the concept. In fact it can be argued
that much of space law is built on soft law ideas. This is because a
great deal of the Outer Space Treaty uses ambiguous language and
creates obligations that lack in precision or obligation and are open to
interpretation by states. For instance, Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty states that:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be
guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the
corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct
exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination
and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and,
41. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54/3 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 421, 422 (2000).

42. Id. They use the term "soft law" to "distinguish this broad class of deviations from
hard law - and, at the other extreme, from purely political arrangements in which
legalization is largely absent." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 423 ("Soft law offers many of the advantages of hard law, avoids some of the
costs of hard law, and has certain independent advantages of its own.").
45. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

526

VOL. 40:1-3

where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this
purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe
that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, it shall
undertake appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party
to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by another State Party in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause
potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment.4 6
The obligations contained in this section are generally "soft" in
nature. The "hardest" obligation is the requirement that states seek
consultations if they think they may cause "harmful interference,"
which does not actually include harmful interference.
The other
obligations are extremely soft in nature are place few limits on the
actions of states. States have rarely (if ever) sought such consultations,
and indeed the idea of a consultation in no way precludes a state from
taking a specific action. Instead it only gives other states the ability to
weigh in to the activity. An example can be seen in the aforementioned
Chinese ASAT test. China did not seek a consultation, and more
importantly, no state, save Japan, 47 invoked Article IX, despite the fact
that there was evidence that the United States knew about the test
beforehand. 4 8 Additionally, the United States decided that it fell
outside Article IX when it conducted an ASAT intercept the following
year. 49 This is because both states were free to interpret Article IX as
they saw fit due to the lack of precision in the Article. Article IX creates
obligations, but they are soft obligations with a low level of precision
and a low level of enforceability. 50 These types of provisions are
46.
47.
48.
49.

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, Art. IX.
Marder, supra note 35, at 11.
JOHNSON-FREESE, supra note 13, at 12.
DoD News Briefing with Deputy National Security Advisor Jeffrey, Gen.

Cartwright and NASA Administrator Griffin, in USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 51, 52

(P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz eds., 2009) ("While we do not believe that we
meet the standard of Article IX of that treaty that says we would have to consult in the
case of generating potentially harmful interference with other activities in space, we do
believe that it is important to keep other countries informed of what is happening.").
50. See HARRISON, supra note 23, at 8-9. "Even in areas of Treaty-imposed constraint
that were remained [sic] pertinent," particularly the prohibitions against "interfering with

2012

RENOVATING SPACE

527

common in space law, because they serve state interests. As a result,
while there is a core of hard provision, space law was developed as a
flexible regime that can be re-envisioned with changes in its underlying
architecture. The values that it supports still serve as important end
goals, but the application of the law can change to best achieve these
goals in any given set of circumstances.
Adapting the Hard Law
If, as argued, the Outer Space Treaty is the proper mechanism to
be regulating space activities in space, and this Treaty consists to a
large extent of soft obligations, then through what mechanisms is this
law to be adapted to new circumstances? This is essentially the same
question that is faced when approaching domestic issues and
constitutional interpretation in light of situations not envisioned by the
framers, especially in light of technological advances. When such
questions arise domestically, competing interpretations vie for
prominence, until an official ruling by an ultimate court gives a
(hopefully) definitive answer to the question. In much the same way,
the Outer Space Treaty, the "constitution" for space, has similar
problems.
The drafters, taking into account the geopolitical
architecture of the time, were often ambiguous as to meaning. In order
to serve state interests, and as technology and the geopolitical
architecture have changed, the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty's
clauses has gradually become more contested. Unfortunately, there is
no "Space Supreme Court" to give definitive interpretations of what
passages require in light of new developments. International law does
present a tool to help elucidate these meanings.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives a rubric for
treaty interpretation. It starts with the idea that the ordinary meaning
of words within the purpose and scope of a treaty should be used to
interpret the treaty text.51 It also allows, as a tenet of treaty
interpretation, interpreters to take into account state practice in
relation to a treaty to determine the meaning of the text. 52 This can be
a powerful tool when looking at soft terms in a treaty.
Returning to the ASAT example and Article IX, we can see how
such interpretation works. In the case of the Chinese ASAT test and

other states' space-related activities" and "damaging the space environment," the OST
had less than decisive impact - not because of an inability to verify, but an unwillingness
to enforce. This unwillingness apparently stems from concern about disclosing sources
and methods, and a reluctance to contribute to the establishment of norms that might
limit freedom of action. Id.
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (1969).
52. Id. art. 31(3b).
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the U.S. intercept of USA-193, the author has previously argued that
state practice points to a de minimis standard of information sharing to
fulfill Article IX requirements. 53 Both states engaged in similar
activity, however, the United States did so with a great deal of
transparency and explicitly acknowledged its Article IX obligations.
China on the other hand acted without transparency. China's test was
condemned diplomatically by the international community and the
United States' was not. From these incidents the contours of the
content of Article IX can begin to be derived. Interestingly, the
adoption of soft law agreements (discussed below) to facilitate more
robust standards could lead in the future to a shift in the meaning of
Article IX to require more than the most basic of information.
Widespread adoption of soft law mechanisms can feasibly transform via
wide state practice to treaty practice.
Extending the Law
It is clear that states are reluctant to adopt new treaties relating to
space activities. One of the major factors for this is that states,
particularly the United States, prioritize national security and are
reluctant to undertake any obligation that would limit activities in
pursuit of such goals. This is best highlighted by the former United
States space policy, which stated that "[t]he United States will oppose
the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to
prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space." 54 States will preserve
their interests in a strategic manner, and not subsume them to new law
unless there is an equally strong advantage. Another issue that stands
in the way of new legal instruments is that of verification. Verification
of compliance with treaties in Outer Space can be technically difficult,
and as a result "[n]o major space actor is likely to accept meaningful
constraints on its freedom of action in space unless it can verify
independently the compliance of others."5 5 States enter treaties when it
is in their best interest, and unverifiable treaties unavoidably create
risks of noncompliance. As a result, states are reluctant to bind
themselves in ways which they see as strategically limiting. Without
new international agreements states are left to rely on the Outer Space
Treaty and its progeny to regulate space. However, these agreements
have proved to have weaknesses that can be exploited. This has been
illustrated by China's ASAT test as well as North Korea's attempted
space launch, which looked suspiciously like an ICBM test.

53. Blount, supra note 22, at 33-35.
54. US National Space Policy, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.html
31, 2006).
55. HARRISON, supra note 23, at 2.
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Despite the unlikelihood of a new treaty that helps to ensure the
future security of space, states have sought other innovative solutions.
These solutions have come in the form of soft law agreements.
Instruments such as the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines5 6 as
well as the European Union's Draft Code of Conduct for Space
5 seek to address the changed geopolitical architecture with
Activities6
instruments to which states can accede without being bound by
international law. These agreements weaken the obligation element so
as to allow states to comfortably pursue goals without the risk of
binding themselves. These types of agreements have advantages for
states. They serve to build confidence among states and help to foster
cooperation.5 8 Also, they can be used as regulation labs, by allowing
states to try out certain regulatory mechanisms with reduced risk if the
mechanisms are not effective. 59 Furthermore, these types of agreements
also can help to fill a void. Whereas before, there was a lack of dialogue
on new agreements, now there is open debate and interaction among
states on these important questions.
These agreements will be
analogous to the idea of lex mercatoria, wherein business actors agree
on best practices and follow these practices out of utility and efficiency.
Soft law mechanisms for space activities seek to bring space actors to
the table and facilitate dialogue on ways in which their own self
interests can be fulfilled via more efficient mechanisms.
One of the major components going forward with such mechanisms
will be the exchange of information. Space is becoming increasingly
congested and a higher risk area in which to operate. States, however,
use space as a crucial component of both commercial infrastructure and
national security infrastructure. The ability to operate in space is
critical. In order to do that effectively states must have information
about the environment in which they are operating.
This was
highlighted recently when a telecommunications satellite collided on
orbit with a defunct Russian governmental satellite. 60 Information
exchange has been entrenched in the space law regime from the very
beginning, but it has never been clear how much information has been
required to be shared. While data exchange will be important in the
emerging soft law regimes, it is important to note that

56. IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-02-01 (Sept. 2007).
57. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions concerning the revised draft
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Council Doc. 14455/10 (Oct. 10, 2010).
58. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 41, at 423 ("soft law facilitates compromise, and thus
mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different interests and values,
different time horizons and discount rates, and different degrees of power.").
59. Id. ("It offers more effective ways to deal with uncertainty, especially when it
initiates processes that allow actors to learn about the impact of agreements over time.").
60. AGI Media Center, Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 Satellite Collision, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.stk.com/corporate/mediaCenter/news/iridium-cosmos/.
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nongovernmental space actors are also seeking to gain access to more
information about the space environment. INTELSAT has spearheaded
a movement wherein commercial actors will exchange information
about the space environment in order that they may all operate more
efficiently creating another layer of soft obligations. 61 These satellite
operators will engage in this effort despite the fact that they are
competitors. This sort of cooperation highlights an important point
about soft law mechanisms. First is that soft law need not be among
states, in fact as non-state actors pursue the exploitation of space they
will develop standards that become a form of "law." Soft law is about
increasing efficiency and guaranteeing operability. To this end, all the
players, not just states will have important input, and such
mechanisms will be adopted at a variety of levels.
Designing New Rooms in the Architecture
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is an extraordinary clause in
international law. It is one of the rare instances recognized in the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility wherein states have opted to adopt
more responsibility for the actions of their nongovernmental actors than
attributed by customary international law. Article VI states that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international
responsibility for national activities in outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out
in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall
require authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are
carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for
compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the
international organization and by the States Parties to the
Treaty participating in such organization.
While there is much debate as to the exact content of Article VI,
one must appreciate the burden and risk that this places on states. By
creating an affirmative obligation to authorize and supervise nongovernmental actors in space in addition to making states responsible
for the activities of these entities, Article VI makes it a high risk
61. See Richard Dalbello, Data Sharingfor Space SituationalAwareness: Government
Responsibility under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, http://www.iislweb.org/
docs/2008-3rd-galloway-dalbello.pdf (Dec. 11, 2008).
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activity for a state to allow commercial actors to operate in the space
environment. In the past legislation has been written so as to help
states effectively fulfill Article VI obligations. Traditionally this has
been through licensing regimes for nongovernmental actors. These
regulations are the feedback loop that helps to inform the international
community what constitutes the proper measures for compliance with
Article VI. Again, this is an area where state action can influence the
interpretation of the Treaty's clause.
As the importance of a healthy commercial space sector has grown,
legislation has begun to increasingly have a different set of goals
underlying it. In general these goals are meant to incentivize doing
business in the space sector. The most prominent example is the oftdiscussed Federal Aviation Administration's Human Spaceflight
Requirements. 62 These United States regulations seek to encourage
private human space flight by, among other things, requiring space
flight providers to give informed consent to space flight participants in
order to reduce possible claims against the space transportation
provider in the case of an accident. 63 These innovative regulations seek
to encourage the industry by reducing the risk of doing business and
thereby increasing the commercial viability of such operations. Other
regulatory regimes have followed suit and attempted to offer other
financial incentives to space actors. 64
This trend is one that will continue as the commercialization of
space continues. It is important to note though, that these are domestic
rules, therefore states must be cautious that they still fulfill their
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, specifically Article VI. The
interplay between domestic legislation and international law will
become an increasingly important theme in the development of
international space law. This is especially true if the number of
commercial actors proliferates as predicted. It should also be noted that
as domestic law develops and defines items such as best practices for
space flight providers, these developments can have influence at the
international level and on the development of soft law mechanisms. For
instance, the FAA regulations seek to not adopt safety guidelines and
standards at a time when it may be too preliminary to know what those
standards should be. This leaves the door open for the industry itself to
adopt these standards for efficiency, creating soft law at the industry

62. Human Spaceflight Requirements, 14 C.F.R. 460 (2011).
63. 14 C.F.R. 460.45. See also Tracey Knutson, What is "Informed Consent" for SpaceFlight Participantsin the Soon-To-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33 J. SPACE L. 105
(2007).
64. See generally P.J. Blount, If You Legislate It They Will Come: Using Incentive
Based Legislation to Attract the Commercial Space Industry, Air & Space Lawyer, v. 22/3
(2009).
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level. The United States can then, as the industry develops, adopt
regulations that solidify these practices.
This adoption can be
influential at the international level as states seek to define how to
engage in space activities in a responsible manner. Mechanisms,
whether hard or soft, that increase safety will be beneficial to
commercial actors, since the perceived safety of the industry will affect
all the entities in involved. States will in turn though have to close the
loop in order to ensure that adopted industry practices comport with
international obligations. As this is done, those mechanisms can
become the mechanisms that build consensus in the international
community via nontraditional law-making routes.
CONCLUSION

Laws, like buildings, sometimes need renovations and updates,
especially when the architecture beneath them has changed.
International space law was mapped onto a geopolitical structure that
no longer controls the dynamics of space activities. It is important that
the law adapt to the changed circumstances. Luckily, international
space law is not in a state of decrepitude wherein it must be torn down.
Instead it can be renovated to work with the new, updated architecture.
This paper has sought to illustrate the likely path that the
development of international space law will take in the future. This
path will be mix of regulatory mechanisms that empower states to best
maintain the domestic advantages they receive from space as well as
the freedom of access and exploration by all states. Importantly, nonstate actors are rising in prominence which leads to particular problems
for international regulations. States will seek to foster these industries,
but at the same time, must fulfill their international obligations.
Though controversial, soft law obligations are the most likely route for
states to take in relation to space activities. This sort of "legal"
mechanism creates favorable situations for states to engage in the
international discourse as well as preserve their own interests.
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